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Economic theory has undergone a very deep transformation
during the last forty years. Its method and its tools of
analysis have evolved dramatically. The standards by which
theoretical statements are now appreciated are far more
demanding, especially from a formal point of view, than was
the case before World War II. Precision and logical validity
in raising questions and problems have increased as we;'l. The
set of hypotheses necessary to deal with the usual issues of
political economy has been made more explicit, allowing
everyone to have a more clearer interpretation of what has
been done in the different fields.
The content and the relevance of the concept of
equilibrium have been strongly affected by these
transformations. This paper, obviously, does not attempt to
give an account of all these changes. It will focus on just
one consequence of this evolution: the relevance of the
concept of equilibrium in dealing with the traditional
question of the working of the market, the central institution
in our economies.
To put the matter very briefly, the question addressed
here concerns the place of equilibrium in economic theory:
does mainstream economics allow for another theoretical
reference? For two centuries at least, equilibrium was
referred to as a particular situation towards which the market
mechanism was supposed to drive the economy. An important
issue was to prove this conjecture. Whereas mainstream
economists (Smith, Ricardo, Stuart Mill, Marshall and Walras)
endeavoured to prove the stability of the market, critical
authors tried to show that certain fundamental flaws of the
market mechanism make instability and crisis the rule in a
capitalist economy. Among the factors said to be responsible3
for this result, the monetary character of the economy seems
the most important (as was emphasized by Boisguilbert,
Sismondi and Marx in the past and by Keynes in our time).
In modern theory, this issue has been less and less
discussed'. Modern debates concern the properties of
different equilibria and rarely the way the equilibrium of the
market is reached. This shift in emphasis is the consequence
of the intrinsic difficulties inherent in the study of global
stability and of the development of a great variety of
equilibria. In its broadest sense, equilibrium denotes a
situation where efforts made by the agents to carry out their
planned actions create conditions such that these actions
would be selected again by the agents if they had the
possibility of repeating their choice. This definition may be
used in very different sets of assumptions (fixed prices,
incomplete markets, asymmetric information etc.). It becomes
clearer and clearer that any situation may be viewed as an
equilibrium position as soon as the "right" ingredients are
put into the model. For instance, unemployment appears to be
a particular equilibrium (D- or K- equilibria) and no longer
a consequence of an inherent instability preventing the
economy from reaching a full employment equilibrium. Even
business cycles, traditionally studied by non-orthodox
theorists who found in the persistence of appreciable
fluctuations of economic activity some presumptions in favour
of the intrinsic instability of the economy, are now conceived
as equilibria positions! Moreover, we have been taught that,
according to the hypothesis of rational individuals,
equilibrium was the only conceivable position for the economy
. This shows how far modern theory has moved from common
intuitions and widely accepted propositions2. This last
observation, although not necessarily a criticism, tends to
point to the need for a better understanding of what economic4
theory actually tells us about the working of the market,
still the main economic institution in our societies.
Rational expectations theorists have claimed the
exclusivity and the universality of equilibrium to be a
consequence of the optimal utilization of the available
information. In this perfect foresight framework, the
question of the market becomes irrelevant since each agent
knows all the actions of other people or, at least, the
outcome of their actions. The problem of coordination between
individual actions is then overlooked. If this view is
accepted, the question of the convergence towards equilibrium,
whatever it may be, would be ruled out ex hypothesi. In a
framework leaving no room for non-equilibrium positions, it
is meaningless to address the traditional and fundamental
question of how the market reaches a position of equilibrium.
Even if one is not ready to subscribe to the rational
expectations point of view, one may, however, be grateful to
R. Lucas and his followers for reminding us of the intrinsic
difficulty of handling non-equilibrium positions. Every
attempt to deal with non-equilibrium positions has to be
rationally justified in one way or another and can no longer
be viewed as self-evident.
Traditional dynamic analysis, which shows that the
economy may behave in various ways around a situation of
equilibrium, seems to have been founded on very weak
behavioral assumptions (adaptative expectations, for example)
and can no longer be accepted as an accurate description of
the actual motion of the economy. Accordingly, non-orthodox
economists must go beyond a verbal critique of equilibrium
methodology and make the foundations of alternative theories
more explicit.
In mainstream theory, equilibrium tends to be both the
result of the market and the rule under which it works.
Without equilibrium, no economic action is going to be5
effective; thus, equilibrium becomes the device by which
individual actions are coordinated and no longer the ultimate
outcome of a market mechanism working under rules of its own3.
In other words, equilibrium is now the alpha and omega
of economic theory. The tool-box of the modern economist
contains only one item adapted to multiple tasks - with the
exception of the task to which economic theory was devoted by
Smith and others.
An investigation of the ability of the market mechanism
to drive the economy towards equilibrium requires that non-
equilibrium situations be regarded as effective. If not, it
would be impossible to speak of a convergence towards
equilibrium but only of a convergence of a series of
equilibria (for example, temporary) towards another
equilibrium (for example, full equilibrium), which leaves
unsolved the question of how any equilibrium is reached.
Within this framework, the imnossibilitv of conceiving of
effective actions outside equilibrium is the main obstacle
which must be overcome.
The purpose of this paper is not to give an answer to the
question outlined above, nor even to attempt to sketch its
general features. Its aim is more modest: to point out the
existence of the problem and to indicate some directions which
further research may profitably take.
In the first section, some arguments are put forth in
favour of a broader concept, viability, which appears closely
related to the monetary character of economic relations.
Viability denotes a situation where the efforts made by
individuals to carry out their planned actions create
effective conditions such that individuals desire to modify
their plans (non-equilibrium) and such that the unexpected
results of these voluntary actions do not lead individuals to
bankruptcy, because the rules of the monetary system allow
individuals to postpone the fulfilment of some of their6
commitments. Money is conceived of as a system of
coordination between individual agents which is an alternative
to equilibrium. Viability is not the negation of equilibrium
but rather a generalization of it, equilibrium being the limit
point, if it exists, of the effective path generated by the
actions of the individuals in the viability set. This
approach seems more in accordance with the older tradition of
political economy.
The second section proposes a simple illustration of the
argument. Using an oversimplified model, it is possible to
show some of the specificities of the adjustment actually
taking place in a monetary economy, by contrast with the
mythical one more or less implicitly referred to in mainstream
economics.
I
Let us start with the following simple question: why
could flow-of-funds data, i.e. the basic form of economic
facts, not be interpreted as describing non-equilibrium
situations? To state it more in accordance with economic
theory, what prevents people from accomplishing their desired
actions (without consideration of their complete mutual
compatibility or without being sure that the results will
conform to their expectations)?
As far as I know, there is no direct and explicit answer
to that question. Most modern economists would agree that
restricting the focus on equilibrium positions is worthwile
since non-equilibrium positions are arbitrary and not
compatible with rational behaviour. The argument goes as
follows: if it were possible for the agents to discover a
better situation, they would act to realize it; if it were
not possible, according to the assumptions of the model, it7
would be an equilibrium position. Equilibrium is then the
only interesting situation to be considered. The argument
implies either that any individual has beforehand a perfect
knowledge of the outcome of the market (rational expectations
hypothesis) or that the process of adjustment is nonexistent
and, therefore, exempt from any path-effect (no effective
transactions are taking place out of equilibrium). For
instance, an agent experiencing excess supply on a market is
led to modify his supply in the next period, but without being
burdened with effective unvoluntary inventories. In other
words, making mistakes is not thought to modify the' f‘inal
outcome of the market (if stable).
According to this view, equilibrium is more than a
presumed outcome of the market mechanism: it is the market
mechanism itself! Since equilibrium is the only position
where individual actions are realized, it becomes the
exclusive mode of coordination between individual actions.
Now we must be aware of the exact meaning of that point
and of the gap between what economic theory does and what it
is alleged to do. Equilibrium as a mode of coordination
between individual agents is not what most economists have in
mind; rather, they argue that equilibrium is the final outcome
of the coordination of individual actions which take place on
the market. The market is intuitively viewed as the tool by
which the economy can reach an equilibrium position4. At the
same time, the same economists admit that the proof of the
existence of general equilibria in an exchange economy (with
perfect competition) is a very important result. Debreu
interprets it as an explanation of "the state of equilibrium
reached by a large number of small agents interacting through
markets" (Debreu [4] p.698), the fundamental question he
thinks Walras raised (F.Hahn would add Smith as well).
However, this interpretation is off the mark. The proof
of the existence of (at least) one set of prices which makes8
the desired transactions of all agents compatible at an
aggregate level is neither a proof that these transactions
actually take place nor a demonstration that a device called
market plays any role in it. To establish that the market,
as a typical way of organising economic relations, is
responsible for achieving equilibrium requires, at least, that
the process of adjustment towards equilibrium has been made
explicit, which in turn implies that non- equilibrium
positions may be considered. This takes us back to our
starting point... .
In order to provide an analytical foundation fbr‘ the
common claim that eauilibrium is an outcome of a market
adjustment process one must not use eauilibrium as the
necessary condition of the realization of planned decisions'.
But is there any alternative? The question now is: what
are the (necessary and sufficient) conditions under which a
private individual intention becomes a social and effective
reality?
Within the framework of general equilibrium theory some
work has been done on that issue. The theory of non-
tatonnement processes takes up frontally the question of non-
equilibrium transactions. In each period, prices having been
fixed by the auctioneer, transactions take place even if the
prices do not equalize aggregate supply and demand on the
markets. Effective transactions obey some predetermined
rules6. The outcome is a non-equilibrium situation.
At this point, a parallel with Fix-price theory is
instructive. Fix-price economists do not consider effective
non-equilibrium situations. Instead, they assume that the
difference between aggregate supply and demand generates some
quantity signals which lead agents to change their plans
which, in turn, generates other quantity signals and so on.
No transactions are realized until quantity signals are such9
that they generate supplies and demands which produce again
the same signals (fixpoint). This is indeed the definition
of a K-equilibrium. The process of adjustment between plans
and quantity signals is purely a myth (Walrasian tatonnement
on quantities) and is noneffective. The only effective
outcome of the process is an equilibrium position. The use
of the term "effective demand" to denote the demand
constrained by the quantity signals is misleading, as is the
designation of Fixprice theory by "disequilibrium theory".
Discussions on non-tbtonnement processes, have
convincingly shown that the behaviour of the economy in
disequilibrium is a major issue. Two aspects of this issue
seem crucial. One is related to the way economic agents
determine their plans when they are aware of the
disequilibrium7. The other concerns the way economic agents
can carry out their decisions independently of their mutual
compatibility. The second aspect only will be considered in
the present paper and we shall see that money is at the heart
of the matter.
Two propositions have been established:
(i) The non-tatonnement is globally stable. One
interpretation of this result may be that the mere possibility
of individuals transacting out of equilibrium changes the
meaning of the auctioneer's rule. Prices vary according to
the result of the working of the market (and not according to
the sign of the aggregate notional excess demand - which
sounds like a partial equilibrium criterion)8. If the market
is well organised (Hahn's condition), this amounts to saying
that each individual is affected in the same way by the change
of prices: a positive (negative) excess demand agent will face
higher (lower) prices on the market in the next period.
Effective transactions (out of equilibrium) affect decisively
the path of the economy.10
(ii) The proposition (i) makes sense only if we justify
the fulfilment of Hahn's condition. This implies the
introduction of a general means of payment, which is called
money.
The reason for introducing money into the picture is
straightforward: money is assumed to be the most appropriate
device to facilitate exchange. To be more precise, the
existence of money is the condition for the existence of n
markets (if there are n goods) where the trading of each
particular good is centralized. In barter, markets do not
exist: the trading of any particular good is disseminated on
(n-1)/2 posts of exchange (the economy is compounded of n(n-
1)/2 posts of exchange).
The reason given above for introducing money into the
theory is not that which rules the equilibrium theory of
money'. In fact, the main motivation for dealing with money
in the general equilibrium framework is not clear. What are
considered the most important results of the theory
(equilibrium existence and welfare theorems) do not require
the existence of money (it is true even for the Fixprice
theory). As a matter of fact, the usual way of dealing with
money makes one think that the introduction of money is
interesting only in order to check the conditions under which
money does not matter (neutrality)...
According to this approach, money is introduced as an
additional good. Its singularity, which defines money among
the goods, is that it is not an argument of any utility
function (this is a negative way of saying that money is
worthwile only for the purpose of transactions). The problem
then is as follows: how can such a good exist in the economy
(read: at equilibrium)? The problem is considered solved if
it is shown that a good without utility may have a positive
equilibrium price.11
Overlapping generations models allow a positive price for
a durable good deprived of utility. It is not the purpose of
this paper to discuss this result. We just need to be
reminded that important qualifications limit the validity and
the interest of the overlapping generations view of money.
Not only does the positive price of money depend on very
special assumptions (value of some parameters even if all
functions are well-behaved, nonexistence of another durable
asset bearing a higher rate of return) but the role of that
money in exchange is limited to the relation between different
generations. Money does not intervene in the exchange
relations between agents of the same generation".
However, we should not be worried by the limited ability
of mainstream economic theory to give an accurate account of
money. The reason for money, as well as its mode of
introduction, is not clear. Furthermore, the organization of
the transactions does not require that money should be part
of the initial endowments of agents and that it should be
treated as a good. Therefore, it is preferable to look for
another starting point. In a different context, it has been
shown that the choice between different organizations of
transactions cannot be solved by recourse to usual criteria".
For instance, monetary exchange equilibria may be Pareto
inferior to barter under very general conditions. The
llbootstrapsl' aspect of money - it is because it is generally
accepted to settle transactions that a particular means of
payment is . . . a means of payment - does not allow its
existence to be explained and derived from the usual
assumptions of economic theory. Money has to be presupposed
at the very outset of the story, not as a contingent element
of a particular theory but as an essential feature of it.
We are quite naturally led to introduce money not as an
additional good but rather as an hypothesis about the way
individual actions are carried out and coordinated.12
Potentiallv, money appears as an alternative to eauilibrium
in describinq the working of the market .
The Finance-constraint theory of money12, which relies
on Glower's idea that @'goods do not buy goods", aims to
establish a rationale for liquidity preference in emphasizing
the role of money in the transactions mechanism. In that
sense, it challenges the usual treatment of money as a
particular commodity and seems to offer an ideal tool for
developing some of the intuitions just mentioned above. But,
in fact, finance-constraint models appear to be very close to
the overlapping generations models and cannot provide a basis
for an alternative theory.
According to finance-constraint theory (especially in
cash-in-advance models), agents are constrained by the amount
of money they have in the current period. For any given
period, effective purchases have to be less than the money
balances inherited from the previous one. In other words, the
sales of one period cannot finance the purchases of the same
period. Money works as if it were a commodity, gold for
instance. Even when this is not the case, as in fiat money
economy, it is assumed at the outset that money is an element
of wealth. It fixes the level of the budgetary constraint in
the same way as initial endowments do in the Walrasian world.
By definition, money is thought to be a commodity. The role
played by this commodity implies that it must be transmitted
from one period to another. Taking for granted that money is
a durable commodity (a store of value), the only problem to
be solved is the traditional one: to prove that money has a
positive value.
The following general argument is at the root of the
dominant conception of money, embodied in overlapping
generations models as well in finance-constraint models: "The
existence of this time wedge between purchase and sale is
fundamental to finance constraint models. If purchases and13
sales were simultaneous, the finance constraint would
disappear, goods would buy goods directly, and money would
have no explicit role in the formal model as a medium of
exchange" ([8] p.8).
The essential elements of an alternative approach have
to be found elsewhere, namely in a brand of monetary thinking
common to Banking Principle proponents and to more recent, but
neglected, authors (R.G.Hawtrey or Keynes of the Treatise).
According to this conception, the banking system is at the
center of the stage, ensuring the carrying out of economic
actions through credit creation. Although it is possible to
introduce money in a perfect competition framework, where
prices are not fixed by the agents13, it is more natural to
express the monetary nature of the economy in an imperfect
competition economy, where agents are price-makers. The
remainder of this section is devoted to this task.
Let us briefly describe the way economic actions are
carried out before dealing with their determination. This
order of presentation, the reverse of the usual one, makes
sense as soon as one realizes that individual economic plans
are established in view of their execution and can no longer
be considered independent of the institutional framework14.
In what follows, the banking and financial system is the main
institution to be taken into consideration.
Banks perform the function of intermediary of exchange
in substituting their signature for that of individuals.
Individual i has no reason to be confident of individual j's
ability to pay. The signature of the bank has greater worth
because a bank acts as a representative of many individuals.
Individuals cannot pay with their own debt. They use the debt
of V1middlementV who are specialized in the task of evaluating
the solvency of agents and their ability to carry out their
actions in a satisfactory way. These middlemen are private
agents but their existence implies some "bootstraptl effects:14
no one can trust a bank unless a sufficient number of other
people do the same. Moreover, as debt transactions managed
by banks are nothing but the consequence of the transactions
of their customers, the question of the relations between
banks raises, at a higher level, the same problem as barter:
what makes a bank accept for payment an asset on another bank?
Again appears the lVbootstrapVV aspect of the mechanism of
payment: as any particular bank represents its customers, we
have to suppose a VlsuperbankV8 which represents all the banks
(and indirectly all the individuals of the economy)..1
Now the question is: what are the criteria by which banks
agree to finance agents's current transactions? It is not
possible to give here a detailed account of the behaviour of
banks. However, three basic propositions may be advanced:
- (i) The l~bootstrapl~ aspect of the means of
payment makes it impossible to conceive of banks, as a whole,
as purely private agents. Because they deal with money, banks
are in charge of a social institution which cannot be reduced
to individual rationality.
- (ii) Banks are still economic agents. Their
behaviour, although constrained by some global and specific
considerations, is not arbitrary. Banks determine their
operations by taking into account the maximization of their
profits. In that sense money is endogenous".
- (iii) To reconcile the two contradictory aspects
of the banking system, it is convenient to assume the
existence, on the one hand, of private agents specialised in
the trade of debts, and, on the other hand, of a lender of
last resort endowed with a social rationality. This is
expressed by the fixation of the rate of interest according
to policy rules established by the lender of last resort.
Private banks will fix their prices (particular rates of
interest on loans) according to the same considerations as
other agents and will accept at these prices all the15
operations meeting some predetermined criteria (prudential
ratios, collaterals, etc.). If necessary, the lender of last
resort may refinance the banks at the rate of interest he
determines. As Basil Moore puts it: "Banks are price setters
and auantitv takers in both their retail loan and their
deposit market. As a result both loans and deposits are
demand determined. ( . ..) Any short-run excess or deficiency
of loan demand over deposit supply of funds can be met in the
wholesale markets where banks in contrast are price takers and
quantity setters."([lO]  pp. 381-382). .
The finance constraint faced by economic agents takes
the form of the set of conditions banks require for according
credit to individuals". In that sense, the agreement of the
banks is a prerequisite for actual transactions to take place.
The conditions under which banks give their agreement, i.e.
the working rules of the banking system, supersede the ad hoc
device of the auctioneer. Banks are an essential gear of the
modern market mechanism.
Individual plans are determined within the context
outlined above. Being in some sense rational, agents
determine simultaneously the set of prices (if price makers)
and quantities which maximize their utility (or their profit).
For a given state of expectations, agents are presumed to be
able to determine the whole set of operations they desire to
carry out in the period under consideration
17 . Consequently,
for a given transaction period, corresponding to the
realization of the planned transactions, sales and purchases
are regarded as simultaneous.
Economic agents are assumed to decide freely (under some
specified constraints) what is to be produced and brought to
the market. As is true for all agents, each individual plans
his transactions without knowing the desired actions of others
(the assumption that he has a thorough knowledge of the past
and that he has some precise opinions about what will happen16
does not change the point). Agents making decisions to be
carried out on the market know, of necessity, that they are
subject to errors and failures. Nothing can be done to
eliminate that uncertainty18. A very distinctive feature of
market coordination (as distinct from relations relying upon
authority, law, custom, central planning or . . . consultation
by an auctioneer) is the necessity for agents to actively
engage in the market in order.to know what other people do.
All agents are perfectly aware that the complete realization
of their notional actions is unlikely. This is not primarily
because their information is imperfect (high informational
costs) but rather because the relevant information is, by
definition, missing. The market cannot be bypassed since it
is the only place where people can perform their actions and
check the accuracy of their plans. The working of the market
has to be made explicit - which is another way of saying that
money has to be taken into consideration.
Any planned transaction cannot be effective unless the
(at least) two agents involved accept it (as being more or
less in accordance with their intentions). But without the
presence of an auctioneer, the agents themselves have to make
known their intentions. Since money is the exclusive means
of payment, the desired transactions must be expressed in
money. They will be carried out on the different markets (a
market for each good) and not on n(n-1)/2 exchange places as
in barter.
A complete transaction is compounded of, at least, a
purchase and a sale. As a consequence of the monetary
character of the exchange, it is not nossible for any aqent
to conclude the two parts of a complete transaction with the
same other asent (the possibility of achieving a complete
transaction between only two agents defines barter).
Transactions are split between markets and not between
different periods. The separation of agents is the17
straightforward consequence of the market coordination and of
the fact that each semi-transaction takes place between
different people. It is not possible for any agent to make
one of the semi-transactions the condition of the other.
Do individuals have sufficient means of payment in order
to carry out their plans? The question is the same as in
finance-constraint theory, but the answer is very different.
Instead of reasoning in gold currency (or the equivalent), we
have to think of a modern banking system where the necessary
amount of means of payment is advanced to the agents, for the
period of transaction. There is no longer a time wedge
between purchases and sales.
Transactions on the market take place according to
precise rules. To specify these rules (and to check the
robustness of the theory in the face of minor changes in these
rules) is a necessary and difficult task. A very crude
attempt will be given in the second section of this paper.
At the present level of abstraction it is enough to
insist on the most obvious consequence of the uncertainty
inherent in the market: in general, actual transactions will
be such that each agent is left at the end of the period with
a discrepancy between his receipts and his expenditures. In
order to avoid bankruptcy, deficit agents must find a
corresponding amount of money to pay back to the bank. This
cannot be done except by incurring debt (which postpones the
effects of the "sanctionl' of the market).
Purchases of some agents are sales for others.
Therefore, the algebraic sum of the differences between
purchases and sales is zero over the economy. In other words,
the absolute value of deficits is identical to the absolute
value of excesses. If it were not for the voluntary choices
of individuals, it would always be possible to match deficits
and excedents over the economy.
Two general cases may be considered19.18
Cl> If individuals agree freely to lend and borrow
(either directly or indirectly through the banks) the amounts
of money needed to avoid bankruptcy, the period closes with
the following characteristics:
all individuals are still alive (economically
speaking)
- at least two individuals (and possibly all) are
left with commitments for the next period(s)
- no money is held in the economy as a whole (no
outside money) ,
This last point requires further explanation. The ‘fact
that no (outside) money is left at the end of the period
(although the economy is out of equilibrium) is partly the
effect of a particular hypothesis which excludes intertemporal
allocation of resources and, by the way, any need for a store
of value. What is interesting is precisely the fact that it
is not necessary to oresuooose any store of value in order to
deal with the monetary aspect of economic transactions. Money
as a means of payment is a uniperiod notion. It is obviously
not the case for money as unit of account. In the economy
described above, the commitments of individuals are expressed
in units of accounts and they have to be fullfilled in those
units of accounts2'. The permanence of the unit of account,
which is clearly a condition for the workins of a monetary
economy, does not require that money should be considered as
a durable sood (store of value).
<2> If individuals or banks are reluctant to lend the
required amounts of money (either directly or indirectly), the
lender of last resort may intervene and make possible the
closure of the market without bankruptcy. In issuing a
sufficient amount of his liability (by lending to banks), he
allows the system to be viable, i.e. to last over time with
the same individuals.19
The main difference from the previous case lies in the
fact that money is held in the economy as a whole (outside
money). Banks, at least, held some positive amounts of the
asset issued by the lender of last resort. To put it in very
general terms, the presence of money (independently of any
intertemporal allocation of resources) is tied to the fact
that bankruptcies have been avoided. The type of non-
equilibrium situation encountered here differs from the
previous one in that the economy as a whole is left with a
debt to be repaid in the future. The non-fulfillmentof this
overall commitment is nothing but inflation.
/ .
The existence of effective non-equilibrium positions
is thus the natural consequence of the special way economic
transactions are carried out on the market. Making explicit
the monetary character of the coordination of individual
actions allows one to think of an actual dynamic process of
the market and not only, as in equilibrium methodology, of a
fictitious one.
In the following section, this general idea will be
illustrated by a very simple model.
II
Let us consider an oversimplified economy where
autonomous agents produce commodities for the market. The
coordination of these agents is ensured by a monetary
mechanism following the general lines described above.
We shall suppose that each agent is specialized in the
production of a particular commodity, so that the number of
agents is the same as the number of commodities, say n.
The technique of production is given by fixed
coefficients aij and lj, respectively quantity of commodity i
and labour 1 necessary to produce one unit of commodity j.
Labour is performed by wage earners. Wage earners are not20
considered as individuals. Hypothetically, they do not have
the ability to carry out economic activities on their own
account. Banks are not ready to give them any means of
payment. In order to be able to buy commodities on the
markets, workers have to get money from individuals
(entrepreneurs) and to become wage earners. The nominal wage
w is constant and predetermined (by negotiations between
entrepreneurs and workers or by maximization of the effort
supplied by workers according to the efficiency wage theory).
It is assumed that labour does not limit the production of the
individuals.
I .
Entrepreneurs are price-makers. The elasticity of the
perceived demand curve of entrepreneur i is equal to ei. As a
consequence, maximization of profits leads entrepreneur i to
fix his price pi in applying to his cost a mark-up mi=ei/l+ei.
Price pi is then:
(1) pi = mi (Cjajipj + lj w)
Prices pj cannot be observed on the market at the time
entrepreneur i determines his price. They are expected
prices.
Prices are in a steady state if, for the economy as a
whole, we have for all (t):
(2) p'ct, = p'W AM +wl'M
where p' is the row vector of prices of the period (t), A the
matrix of aij and M the diagonal matrix of the mi. The steady
state is: I
(2’) p'* = w l'M(I-A)-'
if (I-A)-' exists, which, supposedly, will be the case.
Moreover, to simplify the story, we shall assume that the
process of adjustment of prices is globally stable so that,
henceforth, prices may be considered constant over time.
The monetary economy is working according to a
generalized version of Kalecki's principle: expected incomes
and costs are spent at the same time. Considering the economy21
as a whole, it does not make sense to determine the incomes
independently of the uses agents make of them. In a flow-of-
funds description of the economy, it is impossible to assess
an economic quantity without taking into consideration its two
sides: receipt and use".
Expected profits per unit of commodity i are:
(3) zi = pi - Cj(ajipj+wlj)
The row vector of expected profits is then:
(4) z' = p'* (I-A) - w 1'
Expenses out of profits are assumed to be distributed
/ .
between industries according to a vector c of fixed
coefficients the sum of which is unity (entrepreneurs have a
unique Cobb-Douglas utility function) so that the vector of
demand out of profits is:
(5) q, = (l+(Y)P*-'  c z' q
where or is a rate of external financing, P*-' the diagonal
matrix of p* and q the vector of the quantities of commodities
produced and brought to the market. Assuming no intertemporal
allocation of resources cy is equal to zero.
For the sake of simplicity, expenses out of wages are
presumed to be distributed in the same way as expenditures out
of profits. As a consequence, the vector of demand
wages is:
(6) q, = p p*-' c z' q + p*-' g
where j3 is the marginal propensity to consume and g a
out of
vector
of exogenous expenditures (autonomous consumption for
instance).
The vector of total demand is the sum of q,, q, and of
Aq which is the demand of inputs:
(7) % = H q + P*-' g
where H = A + (l+cr)P*-'  c z'+ p P*-' c z'.
The vector of excess demand is:
(8) % -q=(H - I) q + p*-' g22
As prices are assumed to be constant over time, profits
are functions of quantities alone. The greater the excess
demand, the greater the difference between effective and
expected profits.
A very usual assumption about the process of adjustment
is to make the variation of quantities produced and brought
to the market a function of profits. The simplest form is:
(9) [dq/dt]<,, = K(H - I) qCt) + KP*-' g
where K is a diagonal matrix of positive coefficients.
It is easy to see that the unique steady-state solution
is given by:
/ .
(10) q* = (I - H)-' + P*-' g
if (I - H)-' exists.
The stability of the ajustment process generated by (9):
(11) 4 (t)  = (30,
e[K(H - I)tl
+ 4*
depends on K(H - I). If all the eigenvalues of K(H - I) have
negative real parts, the process is globally stable.
Henceforth, this will be considered the case.
Putting aside the technical discussion of the conditions
of stability, it is worth noticing that the process given by
(9) does not reflect what happens in an economy where
transactions are effective. The unexpected gains or losses
are not only information supplied to entrepreneurs, they are
also actual gains and losses revealing an actual non-
equilibrium position as a consequence of which some
entrepreneurs may go into bankruptcy. Taking into
consideration the monetary organization of economic
transactions makes explicit the consequences of the
differences between what was expected and what is actually
realized.
An important task, nearly always neglected by Keynesian
economists, is to specify the actual transactions taking place
out of equilibrium. As a first and crude approximation, it
is possible to suggest the following rules:23
(i) ,Individuals purchase the planned quantities even if
the observed prices differ from the expected ones. In defence
of this heroic assumption, it may be argued that the
quantities expended out of net expected value do not depend
on prices (because of the Cobb-Douglas utility functions) and
that inputs are dependent on the quantity previously decided.
It is true, however, that a revision of the expected net
income should be taken into account. But, as emphasized
above, the monetary character of exchange makes this revision
difficult. .
This assumption plays no role in the model since ke‘have
assumed that prices are equal to p*. It would be very
important, however, if the model were to be extended.
(ii) It is assumed that quantities are, in any case,
sufficient to match the demand (costless past inventories are
presumed to fill the difference). This assumption is nothing
but a device to make the story as simple as possible.
(iii) The difference between the money borrowed and the
money paid back - which is equal to zero for the economy as
a whole since payments are simultaneously expenses and
receipts - has to be matched by lending or borrowing.
If excess agents agree spontaneously to lend directly to
deficit agents, the financial position of entrepreneurs may
be considered safe. Even if their profitability is less than
expected, they run no risk of bankruptcy: claims held by other
agents show only that the capital has been redistributed in
the economy.
If excess agents do not find it expedient to lend to
deficit agents and prefer assets on the Bank (liquidity
preference), bankruptcies will occur, unless banks agree to
accept the risk. In that case, entrepreneurs, although not
going into bankruptcy, are in a worse financial position than
in the previous case. One would assume that they will be
aware of that in shaping their plans for the next period.24
If banks are not ready to take the risk of lending to
deficit entrepreneurs, a major crisis may take place and the
viability of the economy will no longer exist. The lender of
last resort has the ability, to a certain extent, to avoid
such a situation by making banks lend what the deficit agents
need.
The existence of a non-zero excess demand is
expressed by a difference between receipts and expenditures.
The vector of these differences is:
(12) S = p (qj - 4) .
where e's = 0, e being the unit vector (the algebraic sum‘of
differences is equal to zero).
The vector s represents the unexpected profitability
(windfall losses or profits) resulting from the working of the
market. But it ought not to be treated only as inducing a
variation in quantities: its actual effectmustbe elucidated.
The deficits have to be covered, which implies that
deficit entrepreneurs run into debt either to other
entrepreneurs and wage-earners or to banks. Debt is carried
over into the next period and influences the decisions taken
for that period.
Moreover, the problem of the modality of the debt is
important (although completely neglected in the standard
adjustment process above).
First of all, the condition of feasibility of the
required financial operations has to be fullfilled. As stated
above, this depends on the rules governing the working of the
banking system as a whole. In other words, the issue is that
of the viability of the economy. If the current conventions
ruling the behaviour of economic agents are not compatible
with what is required to make non-equilibrium positions
effective, the very existence of the economy is at stake.
This point is not only of theoretical interest. In the past,
we have experienced situations of major crisis when a change25
in the rules of the game was the condition of the survival of
the economic system (Great Depression, abandonment of Gold
Exchange Standard etc.). Even if we discard these extreme
situations by assuming that viability conditions are
satisfied, the fact remains that the financial closure of the
market may take different forms; the most obvious point here
is whether the lender of last resort must intervene or not.
Within this simple framework, it is not possible to take into
account the complexity and the variety of financial
situations. It is, however, possible to formalize, in rough
draft, the main issue.
/ .
Each entrepreneur is not only concerned with his own
position but with the macroeconomic situation as well. If the
financial closure of the market is very difficult and requires
a massive intervention on the part of the lender of last
resort - which will be the case if the absolute value of
deficits and excesses is great - all entrepreneurs will be
subjected to a change in the general conditions of business
(raise in rates of interest, credit rationing etc.) and will
be induced to lower the level of their activity..
The simplest way to incorporate this idea into the
adjustment process is to make the variation in the quantities
a function not only of the unexpected individual profits or
losses but also of a global measure of the disequilibrium.
As a matter of fact, entrepreneurs are concerned only
indirectly by the situation of the economy as a whole. The
link between the macroeconomic situation and the decisions
of entrepreneurs is provided here by the rate of interest.
The lender of last resort is assumed to make the rate of
interest vary according to the global financial situation,
defined by the excesses and deficits. As a measure of
disequilibrium, we shall adopt the Euclidian norm of the
vector of the individual discrepancies between receipts and26
expenses (i.e. the square root of the sum of the squared
deficits and excesses)22.
The risk incurred by the economy is not a linear
function of the global disequilibrium. Accordingly, the
reaction of the lender of last resort is proportionally more
drastic when the risk of non-viability increases. This non-
linearity is inherent in an economy where viability is an
issue. In contrast to the mythical adjustment associated with
equilibrium methodology, where nothing happens except in
equilibrium, a monetary-regulated economy is bound to,undergo
a great variety of situations, some of which are even capable
of questioning its mere existence. The uncertainty stemming
from the market mechanism is not only a matter of degree (how
much?) but also of nature (will the economy continue to
exist?)
To take into account this essential feature, the rate of
interest will be assumed to vary with the squared measure of
the global disequilibrium:
(13) [dr/dtl ctI = 6 r@(t) - @I2
where 6 is a coefficient of reaction, @ a predetermined target
of economic policy for @ defined as:
(14) @ = [P,@j-q),2+  l * •+P”(~-q)“21”2
The entrepreneurs are assumed to adjust their decisions
according to;
(15) [ds/Wt,, =  W-I- 1) W - ct) ctj - kfW/dtl,,,
where kf is a vector of reaction coefficients.
In putting the value of dr/dt given by (13) into (15) we
get a process of adjustment in a monetary framework:
(16)  FWW~,, = K(H- 1) (qd - q),,, - kfU@,,, - @I2
If kf = 0 (or if 6 = 0), the system (16) reduces to system
(9) I which is a special case where the mechanism of
transactions is overlooked.
The discussion of the stability of the solution(s) of
(16) is not easy and will be restricted to the simple case of27
a two-commodity economy (see appendix for a sketchy
examination of a three-commodity economy).
In a two-commodity economy, where it is assumed that wage
earners do not save, the excess (deficit) of one entrepreneur
is the deficit (excess) of the other. Moreover, we have a very
simple relation between @ and sl:
(14a) %) = 2'5 ISII(,)
System (16) may be written:
(16a) Wq,/W,,, = k, slctj - kf,6 (@-G) ttj2
Cdq,/dtl,,, = -k, slctj - kf,d (G-d) $
From equations (8) and (12) we have:
/ .
WW Sl(t) = Pl(hll-~)ql(t)  + plh12q2(t)  + WPl
and, consequently:
(17) W+tl ctI = Pl(%l -1) Wq,/W,,, +
P,h,,Cdq,/W ctj
Substituting (16a) in (17) gives the evolution of s, over
time:
(18) W,/dtlct, =  a slctj - b [&-@I2
where a = Plwhl -1)-k2h,2] and b = &p,[kf,(h,,-l)+kf,h,,]  .
Since h,, < 1 and k,, k,, and h,, > 0, a < 0. Sign of b is
positive or negative according to kf,(h,,-1) > or < kf,h,,.
Taking into account (14a) leads to the final step:
(19) W,/dtltt, = a slct) - b [2~,~+r&'-2@2.~1s,/  ]
Let us first assume &J = 0. Clearly, the process (19) has
two equilibrium points s,* = 0 and s,** = a/2b. It is easy to
check that s,* is locally stable (derivative for s,* = a < 0)
and that s,** is locally unstable (derivative for s,** = -a >
0) l Any initial condition s,(~) > Is,**] generates an explosive
path . If &is different from zero, the two equilibria imply
a permanent non-zero debt!
The three-commodity economy reviewed in the appendix
exhibits the same properties.
*
* *28
The general purpose of the model above is to give some
formal illustration of the thesis advocated in the first
section of the paper. One of its main outcomes is to show the
destabilizing character of the debt related to the non-
fulfillment of the entrepreneurs' expectations. To understand
the meaning of this result, the reader has to keep in mind
that the debt under consideration is not related to any
voluntary intertemporal allocation of resources but is the
consequence of a disequilibrium and, at the same time, the
condition of its effectiveness. In other words, the 'actual
process of the market (as opposed to the fictitious adjustment
associated with the exclusivity of equilibrium) generates
consequences of its own. Even if entrepreneurs react in the
right direction, the economy keeps traces of the
maladjustments in the form of financial commitments. By its
very nature, the evolution of the monetary economy undergoes
path-effects. Ensuring the viability of the economy
(represented in the model by the effects of the action of the
lender of last resort on the rate of interest) induces
specific phenomena and alters dramatically the dynamic
properties of the market.
In the model presented here, the market mechanism turns
out to be stable only if entrepreneurs are not too far from
the stable equilibrium. Beyond a certain range, market
mechanism fails to drive the economy towards equilibrium and
the conditions of the viability of economy are no longer
fulfilled.
Drawing economic policy conclusions from such an
elementary model would be hazardous. However, it is worth
noticing that the issue at stake suggested by the model is
not a choice between interventionism and liberalism. The
lender of last resort is an inescapable component of market
economies and it would not make sense to speak of non-29
interventionism. The approach advocated here leads rather to
an insistence on the necessity for making the rules of the
game more explicit and for inquiring into the relations
existing between these rules and the stability of the market
economy.
APPENDIX \
In a three-commodity economy where it is assumed that
wage earners do not save, the excess (deficit) of an
entrepreneur is the deficit or excess of the others taken as
a whole. System (15) may be written, putting @ = 0:
Wq,/W ctj =  J++,) -kf,b+,,2
(a) PN,/dtl ct) = k2s& -kf2b+,,2
V&@U ctj = -k, [~l~,,+s2~,,  1 -kf,b+,,’
In putting the value of (G-q) given by (8) into (12) and
in differentiating over time, we get dsi/dt as functions of si
and # (H and p are constant over time):
W,/W = p1 (h,,-1) [W&W +p,h,,[dq,/dtl+
p,h,, WqJdt 1
(b) Ws,/W = P,$, [W&W + ~#,,-l) PQ,/W+
P2h2, [ fQ/dt 1
Using (14), (a) and (b) we get the following non-linear
system of two differential equations:
[%/dtl(t,  = Z1lSl(t)  + Z12S2(t) - Z13h,2 +
S2(t,21
(c> [ds2/dtl(t,  =  Z21Sl(t) +  Z22S2(t) - Z23ht,2+
S2w21
where zll = k,p,(hll-~)-k3plh13r  q2 = k,p,h,,, z13 = kf,~~,(h,,-l) +
kf26plh12 +  kf3JPlh13,  ~21 = k2P2h2q-k3P2h23t  ~22 = k2~2($2-1)  and ~23
= kf,cSp,h,, + kf,Jp,(h,,-1) + kf,Jp,h,,.The process (c) has two stationary solutions given by the
intersections of the two curves:
zllSl(t) + Z12S2(t) - %3h(t) 2+ S2(t,2]=0
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The diagram above is drawn for a VUplausibleV1 numerical
example (given below). It gives some hints at the properties
of the system (c). The arrows give a crude idea of the vector
field. It is enough for our purpose to recognize that the
zone at the northwest of E** is one zone of instability.J” Lo- _J
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1. The non-tatonnement models are the most important attempts
to deal with the question of the convergence of an effective
dynamic path towards equilibrium (as opposed to tstonnement
processes where the path is imaginary). See F. Fisher [6].
2. For example, the proposition according to which
fluctuations in the level of activity are caused by the
economic policies endeavouring to fight disequilibrium
inflation or disequilibrium unemployment - widely admitted by
economists - is not rationally founded on economic theory.
3. An interesting example of the bias induced by the
exclusivity of equilibrium may be found in the development and
evolution of the Fix-price theory of temporary equilibria.
Partially founded on Glower's claim that the monetary
mechanism ought to be taken into account to explain the
persistence of unemployment, the theory turned out to
interpret durable unemployment as an example of Nash-
equilibrim where money has no role to play.
4. This proposition is one of the central contentions in the
development of political economy since Adam Smith. One may
be tempted to call it Smith's conjecture, just to remind
ourselves that it has not yet been proved...
5. Even if it is sometimes acknowledged that equilibrium is
not a sufficient condition for transactions to be effective
(because of the impossibilities of barter for instance),
economists nearly always tend to forget it and to accept the
proof of the existence of an equilibrium as the final word in
the question of the existence of a market economy.32
6. A detailed account of these rules is to be found in K.
Arrow and F. Hahn [l] and F. Fisher [6].
7. See F. Fisher and D.O.Stahl [13]
8. If Hahn's condition is fulfilled (the sign of the
individual excess demands is the same as the sign of the
market excess demand), there is an equivalence between the
rule of tatonnement and that of non- tatonnement. This is why
they are not distinguished in the literature: the formal
identity hides the fact that they do not apply to the same
excess demand (respectively before and after the market).
9. There are interesting exceptions. It is not possible to
cite all of them. See however Starr [13], Ostroy [lf]& etc.
10. On these points see C. Benetti [2].
ll.See K.Iwai [7]
12. See M. Kohn [8]
13. See C. Benetti and J. Cartelier [3]
14. Mainstream theory presupposes implicitly a particular
institutional context: the auctioneer, in the Walrasian
tatonnement, drives a process of consultation which ends just
before the opening of the effective market (where transactions
can be observed)(see M. Devroey [5]). In that sense, the
debate is not between institutional economics and pure
economics but between the accuracy of the institutional
framework implicitly or explicitly assumed.
15. For an extensive exposition of this point see B. Moore
[lOI
16. In what follows, the only credits considered are those
which finance current purchases. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume there is no voluntary intertemporal allocation of
resources. Thus, an equilibrium position implies that no
debts are to be carried beyond the period. Any indebtedness
at the end of the market reveals a non-equilibrium situation.
17.The question of the nature of these expectations is
crucial. It is not possible here to develop the point except
to suggest that expectations of economic agents are
necessarily related to those of banks. As banks are partly
the reflection of their customers, it becomes clear that the
formation of expectations has something to do with
conventional behaviour.33
18. Even if we presume that this uncertainty may be discussed
in terms of subjective probabilities, it is impossible to
avoid the fact that people are diversely confident about the
probabilities they attribute to diverse events.
19. In a continuous time, agents learn at each point of time
how things are operating on the market. They can adjust their
plans (prices or quantities) and engage in unexpected
financial operations continously. As we reason within
discrete periods, we shall adopt, for the sake of convenience,
the assumption that economic transactions are first carried
out and then that unexpected financial transactions follow.
This is purely a device of presentation which entails no
special conclusion. .
20. It is tempting here to remind the reader of the old-
fashioned debate between Realists and Nominalists. Under
modern disguise, the protagonists still play their usual role.
The critique of value theory and the rehabilitation of
nominalism are one and the same way of considering money.
21. The so-called problem: "where does the money financing
the profits come from?I' is raised only because some economists
forget the two-sided aspect of any monetary quantity.
Transposing for the whole economy what seems to be the
experience of a single individual (the income has to be earned
before being spent, a doubtful proposition indeed) is
misleading. If expected profits were not spent it would be
impossible to have positive profits in the economy as a whole.
The proof is staightforward. Let us suppose that only costs
were spent (inputs and wages). As the total of receipts is
identical to the total of expenses for the economy as a whole,
receipts would be equal to costs...
22. As the algebraic sum of excesses and deficits is
identically zero, it cannot be used for that purpose.
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